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Comment 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA: The 
Search for Meaningful Regulation of Interstate 
Pollution Under the Clean Air Act 
Bryan Dooley* 
In August 2011, the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) promulgated the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
(also known as the Transport Rule or CAIR Replacement 
Rule),1 which is the EPA’s most recent attempt to regulate 
interstate air pollution under the “good neighbor provision” of 
the Clean Air Act.2 The rule set emission-reduction 
requirements for twenty-eight eastern states, primarily 
targeting fossil-fuel-fired power plants, and simultaneously 
issued federal implementation plans to implement the 
reductions in each affected state.3 A number of state and local 
governments, industry groups, and labor organizations opposed 
to the rule petitioned for its review.4 On August 21, 2012, a 
divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion vacating the 
rule, holding that the EPA had exceeded its congressionally 
granted authority under the Clean Air Act.5 The court denied a 
petition by the EPA for rehearing of the case en banc.6 
                                                          
© 2013 Bryan Dooley 
* J.D.Candidate (2014), University of Minnesota Law School. The author 
would like to thank Professor Brad Karkkainen for his help and guidance and 
the staff and editors of MJLST for their work to improve this Comment. 
 1. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine 
Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 
48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97) 
[hereinafter CSAPR]. 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006); see also EME Homer City 
Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 3. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 11. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc, EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P. v. EPA, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 24, 2013); D.C. Circuit Declines to 
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EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA illustrates the 
difficulty the EPA faces as it attempts to formulate effective 
and efficient regulation of cross-border environmental harm 
within the boundaries created by the Clean Air Act. The 
decision imposes new limitations on the EPA’s ability to enact 
and enforce regional solutions to what is a fundamentally 
regional problem.7 Meanwhile, downwind states continue to 
bear the public health and regulatory burdens resulting from 
upwind contributions to poor air quality.8 
This Comment will analyze the implications of EME 
Homer City Generation for future attempts at meaningful 
regulation of interstate air pollution. Part I will briefly examine 
the historical failures of federal regulation to adequately 
address the problem and recent attempts to regulate under the 
Act. Part II will discuss the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, the 
EME Homer City Generation decision, and prospects for future 
regulation in detail. This Comment concludes that the EPA 
should appeal the decision to the Supreme Court and it should 
be overturned. If the decision is allowed to stand, amendment 
of the Clean Air Act is necessary to allow regulation of 
interstate air pollution that is effective and not unnecessarily 
burdensome. 
I. HISTORY OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF  
INTERSTATE AIR POLLUTION 
The Supreme Court began hearing common-law disputes 
involving interstate air pollution in the early twentieth 
century.9 Courts—though frequently reluctant to tackle the 
factual complexity and uncertainty inherent in evaluating the 
competing scientific and technical claims involved in such 
cases—remained the primary avenue for states seeking  
 
 
                                                          
Rehear Decision Vacating EPA Cross-State Air Rule,  BLOOMBERG BNA  (Jan. 
25, 2013), http://www.bna.com/dc-circuit-declines-n17179872026/. 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 8. Protecting Clean Air and Public Health, CARPER.SENATE.GOV, 
http://www.carper.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/protecting-clean-air-and-public-
health-in-congress (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
 9. See Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal 
for an Interstate Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 49, 62–68 (2008) (discussing early cases implicating interstate 
environmental harm). 
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abatement of interstate environmental harm until passage of 
the substantial environmental legislation of the 1970s.10 
The federal government took its first tentative steps into 
the realm of air quality regulation in 1955, its role limited to 
providing assistance in research, training, and technical 
matters to state and local authorities.11 Congress gradually 
expanded this role through a series of legislative acts during 
the 1960s,12 including the passage of the Clean Air Act of 
1963.13 The Act authorized expansion of research efforts and 
grants of federal funds to state environmental quality 
agencies.14 It also allowed direct federal intervention, via 
litigation on behalf of the United States, for abatement of 
interstate pollution where other procedures outlined in the 
legislation failed to produce adequate corrective action at the 
state level.15 The Air Quality Act of 1967 created additional 
federal supervisory and enforcement responsibilities, but left 
determinations as to acceptable levels of air pollution and how 
and when they should be realized largely to state discretion.16 
While pre-1970 legislation included some limited room for 
federal enforcement, it addressed disputes involving interstate 
pollution primarily by providing for interstate conferences 
intended to promote cooperative state action, with the federal 
government acting as a mediator and facilitator.17 
                                                          
 10. See id. at 69. 
[T]he factfinding process we are asked to undertake is, to say the 
least, formidable. . . . Indeed, Ohio is raising factual questions that 
are essentially ones of first impression to the scientists. The notion 
that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most competent 
Special Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to 
unravel these complexities is, to say the least, unrealistic. Nor would 
it suffice to impose on Ohio an unusually high standard of proof. That 
might serve to mitigate our personal difficulties in seeking a just 
result that comports with sound judicial administration, but would 
not lessen the complexity of the task of preparing responsibly to 
exercise our judgment, or the serious drain on the resources of this 
Court it would entail. 
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1971). 
 11. See Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63 (1975). 
 12. See id. at 63–64. 
 13. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
 14. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64. 
 15. § 5, 77 Stat. at 396–99. 
 16. Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967); see 
Train, 421 U.S. at 64. 
 17. Geoffrey L. Wilcox, New England and the Challenge of Interstate 
Ozone Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1990, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
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A. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 AND 1977 
Dissatisfaction with the failure of the previous decade’s 
legislation to spur meaningful progress toward cleaner air 
prompted Congress to enact the Clean Air Amendments of 
1970.18 The amendments called for a more active federal role 
and established the backbone of the modern regulatory scheme, 
under which the EPA sets uniform, health-based standards for 
harmful pollutants (National Ambient Air Quality Standards, 
or NAAQS).19 The legislation required states to submit a state 
implementation plan (SIP) for implementation, maintenance, 
and enforcement of NAAQS for each air quality control region 
within the state and authorized the EPA to impose a federal 
implementation plan (FIP) if a SIP is not submitted or the EPA 
deems it unsatisfactory.20 
The 1970 amendments addressed the problem of interstate 
air pollution in section 110(a)(2)(E), the earliest incarnation of 
the “good neighbor provision.”21 The provision required that 
SIPs contain “adequate provisions for intergovernmental 
cooperation, including measures necessary to insure that 
emissions of air pollutants from sources located in any air 
quality control region will not interfere with the attainment or 
maintenance” of NAAQS in out-of-state areas.22 In spite of the 
statute’s “measures necessary to insure” language, the EPA 
interpreted the section as intended by Congress primarily to 
facilitate communication and information-sharing.23 Like the 
ineffectual pre-1970 system of conferences, the EPA’s rule 
implementing this interpretation relied in large part on the 
voluntary cooperation of states.24 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld this interpretation 
against a challenge by environmental groups.25 
In retrospect, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 may have 
                                                          
1, 13–14 (1996). 
 18. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; see 
Train, 421 U.S. at 64. 
 19. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 109 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409 (2006)). 
 20. Id. § 110 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006)). 
 21. Id. § 110(a)(2)(E) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006)). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 15. 
 24. Id. at 13–14. 
 25. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 692–93 (8th 
Cir. 1973); see Wilcox, supra note 17, at 15. 
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actually encouraged states to export air pollution. The federal 
framework created an incentive for states, which had not 
previously imposed extensive regulation on polluters but were 
now pushed to do so, to externalize both the negative 
environmental effects of air pollution and the new regulatory 
burdens created by the Act.26 In the absence of any meaningful 
regulatory disincentive, some states designed SIPs to allow 
polluters to decrease their local environmental impact by 
building taller exhaust stacks—which disperse pollutants more 
widely—rather than reducing emissions.27 Judicial rejection of 
the EPA’s approval of one such SIP in 1974 prompted the EPA 
to issue regulations limiting the benefit of tall stacks toward 
achievement of regulatory goals.28 Congress directly addressed 
this issue in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.29 The 
amendments denied credit toward required air pollution 
controls for the portion of any stack constructed after 
enactment of the Clean Air Act of 1970 extending above the 
height called for by “good engineering practice,” as defined by 
the EPA.30 
In an effort to reroute the course of regulation under the 
EPA and judicial interpretation, the 1970 amendments also 
contained a significant revision of section 110(a)(2)(E), the good 
neighbor provision.31 The new language required SIPs to 
contain provisions “prohibiting any stationary source within 
the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which 
will . . . prevent attainment or maintenance by any other State” 
of NAAQS.32 The section’s textual limitation to individual 
                                                          
 26. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental 
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2351–52 (1996). 
 27. Id. At least fifteen SIPs submitted in response to the initial NAAQS 
contained such provisions. The number of stacks taller than 500 feet increased 
from two in 1970 to more than 180 in 1985, with twenty-three at least 1000 
feet tall. Id. at 2351–53. 
 28. Id. at 2354. 
 29. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 121, 91 Stat. 
685, 721–22 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7423 (2006)). Among other things, 
the 1977 amendments also added separate, specific regulatory requirements 
for areas designated nonattainment and those in attainment of NAAQS, key 
elements of the modern regulatory regime. Id. §§ 127, 129 (current version at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7470, 7502 note (2006)). 
 30. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 121 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7423 (2006)). 
 31. See Wilcox, supra note 17, at 18. 
 32. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 108 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
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stationary sources and failure to define key words such as 
“prevent” again left difficult decisions as to how the language 
could and should be applied.33 As a result, the amended 
language ultimately granted little relief to downwind states.34 
The amendments further attempted to address interstate 
pollution with the addition of section 126, which contained two 
important provisions.35 Section 126(a) required upwind states 
to give notice and disclose certain information related to 
proposed new or modified stationary sources expected to 
“significantly contribute to levels of air pollution” in excess of 
NAAQS in out-of-state areas.36 This notice provision provided 
downwind states with emissions data that would otherwise be 
difficult to obtain and allowed states that might be adversely 
affected by proposed projects to mount early challenges.37 
Section 126(b) created a new enforcement mechanism, under 
which states could petition the EPA “for a finding that any 
major source emits or would emit any air pollutant in violation 
of the prohibition of section 110(a)(2)(E)(i).”38 Upon such a 
finding, section 126(c) granted the EPA authority to block 
construction of a proposed new or modified source or to shut 
down an existing source within three months.39 A combination 
of technological limitations on the ability of states to trace 
quantifiable amounts of pollution to a single out-of-state 
source, statutory limitations on the types of sources subject to 
enforcement, and the EPA reticence, however, made the new 
enforcement mechanism effectively useless.40 No state 
effectively petitioned the EPA for redress under section 126 
until 1998, eight years after substantial revisions to relevant 
portions of the Act in 1990.41 
                                                          
§ 7410(a)(2)(D) (2011)). 
 33. See Wilcox, supra note 17, at 19–22 (discussing EPA and judicial 
interpretation of the amended section 110(a)(2)(E)). 
 34. Id. at 22–24. 
 35. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 123 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7426 (2006)). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 23. 
 38. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 § 123 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7426 (2006)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 23–27. 
 41. Hall, supra note 9, at 72; see generally Wilcox, supra note 17, at 24–27 
(discussing judicial challenges to the EPA’s denial of state petitions under  
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B. CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 contained 
numerous significant changes to the statute, most of which are 
beyond the scope of this Comment.42 These changes included 
new programs aimed squarely at the issue of regional pollution. 
First, the amendments established Title IV, an expansive 
program intended to mitigate the harmful environmental 
effects of acid rain.43 Title IV targets emissions of sulfur dioxide 
and nitrogen oxides, which are the primary contributors to the 
formation of acid rain.44 It regulates electrical utilities, which 
were responsible for seventy percent of national emissions 
when Congress enacted the 1990 amendments.45 The program 
regulates sulfur dioxides through a market-based cap-and-
trade system, under which utility generators receive a set 
number of allowances each year permitting emission of one ton 
of sulfur dioxide during the year.46 A regulated source can 
comply by reducing emissions to match its number of 
allowances, purchasing allowances for additional emissions, or 
reducing more than its necessary emissions and either selling 
excess allowances to another source or “banking” them for later 
use.47 
Second, among a number of new provisions aimed at ozone 
pollution, the amendments established an “ozone transport 
region,” comprised of eleven Northeast states and the District 
of Columbia,48 and allowed for establishment of additional 
transport regions.49 States included in ozone-transport regions 
                                                          
section 126 and the resulting development of the relevant statutory 
interpretation). 
 42. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 
2399. 
 43. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7651–51o (2006)). 
 44. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7651(a)(2), (b) (2006). 
 45. Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work: An Analysis of the 
Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur Dioxide 
Under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 319 (2001). 
 46. Overview—The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, EPA, 
http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa_overview.html#titleIV (last updated Dec. 19, 2008). 
 47. Swift, supra note 45, at 320–21. Sources that emit in excess of their 
allowances are subject to a $2,000-per-ton penalty; must offset excess 
emissions, generally during the following year; and receive reduced future 
allowances equal to their excess emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7651j (a)–(c) (2006). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c (2006). 
 49. Id. § 7506a. 
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must adopt specified measures targeting ozone precursors as 
SIP provisions.50 Regional commissions, by a majority vote of 
governors of member states, may also petition the EPA to 
require additional control measures.51 If the EPA approves a 
recommended control measure after a notice and comment 
period, the statute requires all member states to revise their 
SIPs to include the measure.52 
The 1990 amendments also altered the existing provisions 
governing interstate pollution, including the good neighbor 
provision (section 110(a)(2)(D) of the amended Act).53 The 
amended provision applies to “any source or other type of 
emissions activity within the State”54 that will emit pollutants 
in amounts that “contribute significantly to nonattainment in, 
or interfere with maintenance by, any other State.”55 Congress 
expanded the enforcement section of section 126 to allow states 
to petition the EPA for a finding that “any major source or 
group of stationary sources emits or would emit any air 
pollutant in violation of the prohibition of section 
7410(a)(2)(D)(ii).”56 
Congress has set strict limitations on judicial review of 
some EPA decisions under the Clean Air Act. First, section 
307(b)(1) requires a petition for judicial review to be filed 
within sixty days of publication of a final rule in the Federal 
Register.57 Second, section 307(d)(7)(B) restricts eligibility for 
judicial review of a rule or procedure to those objections “raised 
with reasonable specificity during the period for public 
comment . . . .”58 
                                                          
 50. Id. § 7511c(b). 
 51. Id. § 7511c(c). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §101(b), 104 
Stat. 2399, 2404 (current version at 42 U.S.C.  § 7410(a)(2)(D) (2006)). 
 54. Id.; cf. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108, 
91 Stat. 685, 693 (1977) (applying only to “any stationary source”). 
 55. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 §101(b); cf. Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977 § 108 (applying to emissions “prevent attainment or 
maintenance by any other State”). Congress may have intended to codify the 
interpretation of the 1977 Act’s “prevent” language developed by EPA through 
the section 126 petition cases. Wilcox, supra note 17, at 31–32. 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 7426(b) (emphasis added). 
 57. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). This section also establishes the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as the exclusive forum for 
initial review of many EPA actions pursuant to the Act. Id. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B). 
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The 1990 amendments suggest that Congress was aware of 
and intended to address historical difficulties of interstate air 
quality regulation under the Clean Air Act. The EPA has 
previously made two substantial attempts to promulgate rules 
under the revised good neighbor provision.59 Both were 
challenged in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, with the disputes centering 
largely around the EPA’s interpretation of the phrase 
“contribute significantly.”60 
C. THE NOX SIP CALL AND THE CLEAN AIR INTERSTATE RULE 
1. The NOx SIP Call and Michigan v. U.S. EPA 
In 1998 the EPA promulgated a rule requiring twenty-two 
states and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs for 
ozone61 due to a finding of failure to meet the obligations 
imposed by the good neighbor provision.62 In order to determine 
which states were “significantly contributing” to downwind 
ozone pollution under the good neighbor provision, the EPA 
first relied on environmental modeling.63 Rather than base its 
determination purely on emission contributions indicated by 
modeling, however, the EPA also examined the types of 
pollution sources found in each state and the amount of 
pollution that could be reduced using specified control 
measures identified as “highly cost-effective.”64 One such 
control measure identified by the EPA was a cap-and-trade 
system for electricity-generating and other large boilers and 
                                                          
 59. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 60. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 61. The Clean Air Act grants EPA the authority to require states to revise 
SIPs found to be inadequate under provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(k)(5). 
 62. Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain 
States in the Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes of 
Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96) [hereinafter NOx SIP Call]. 
 63. Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 673, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see 
Patricia Ross McCubbin, Cap and Trade Programs Under the Clean Air Act: 
Lessons from the Clean Air Interstate Rule and the NOx Sip Call, 18 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2009). 
 64. McCubbin, supra note 63, at 6. The EPA defined “highly cost-effective” 
control measures as those that would cost no more on average than $2,000 per 
ton of pollution reduced. NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377–78. 
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turbines.65 The rule set each state’s significant contribution for 
purposes of the good neighbor provision at the amount of 
reduction obtainable by highly cost-effective control 
measures.66 
Eight affected states and numerous industrial entities 
challenged the rule on a variety of grounds in Michigan v. U.S. 
EPA.67 A majority of the court held, among other things, that 
nothing in the text, structure, or legislative history of the good 
neighbor provision precluded the EPA from considering cost in 
its definition of significant contribution.68 The eight states also 
challenged the use of the EPA-defined highly cost-effective 
control measures to calculate state emission budgets because 
they intruded on states’ statutory rights to select their own 
control measures.69 In rejecting this challenge, the court held 
that, while the EPA relied on identified highly cost-effective 
control measures to establish each state’s obligation, the rule 
did not restrict the state’s discretion to meet that obligation by 
any other combination of measures.70 
2. The Clean Air Interstate Rule and North Carolina v. EPA 
The EPA promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule 
(CAIR), the EPA’s second attempt to implement the good 
neighbor provision, in 2005.71 CAIR called on twenty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia to revise their SIPs to 
provide for reductions to sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous oxide 
(NOx) emissions determined to contribute significantly to air 
quality problems in downwind states.72 
CAIR identified the obligations of covered upwind states in 
two stages. First, based on environmental modeling, the EPA 
                                                          
 65. NOx SIP Call,  63 Fed. Reg. at 57,378. 
 66. Id. 
 67. McCubbin, supra note 63, at 7 (citing Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 
663, 667–68 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). 
 68. Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d at 669, 676–79. 
 69. Id. at 686–87. 
 70. Id. at 688. 
 71. Rule To Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to Acid Rain Program; Revisions 
to the NOx SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified in 
scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.) [hereinafter Clean Air Interstate Rule]. 
 72. Id. at 25,167. NOx is an important precursor to ground-level ozone, 
while both NOx and SO2 contribute to atmospheric formation of fine 
particulate matter (PM2.5). Id. 
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identified states that met certain thresholds for contribution to 
downwind air quality degradation.73 Both CAIR and the NOx 
SIP Call relied on output-based control rates for electric 
generating units based on the number of pounds of NOx 
emitted per million British thermal units of energy generated 
(lbs/mmBtu).74 Instead of relying on state-by-state 
determinations of actual contribution to set reduction targets, 
however, CAIR took a regional approach.75 To determine the 
regional NOx budget (the total amount of NOx to be eliminated 
throughout the CAIR region), the EPA multiplied the combined 
average annual heat input of all power plants in states above 
the contribution threshold by the control rate, which was 
determined to reflect implementation of “highly cost-effective” 
control technology.76 The EPA then divided this budget among 
the states according to each state’s contribution to the regional 
total, modified based on the proportion of oil-, coal-, and gas-
fired plants within the state.77 EPA identified adjustment 
factors of 1.0 for coal, 0.4 for gas, and 0.6 for oil, which were 
intended to reflect the differing reduction burdens and 
associated costs associated with each fuel type.78 CAIR called 
for an initial NOx control rate to take effect in 2009, with a 
more stringent limit slated for 2015.79 SO2 budgets were based 
on the number of allowances issued under the existing Title IV 
cap-and-trade program and were to be reduced by fifty percent 
in 2010 and sixty-five percent in 2015.80 
                                                          
 73. Id. at 25,191. A state met the threshold for PM2.5 contribution if 
modeling determined the state’s downwind contribution amounted to at least 
0.2 micrograms per cubic meter (g/m3), which is approximately one percent of 
the relevant NAAQS. Id. The significance threshold for ozone was more 
complicated. First, to be subject to CAIR a state’s contribution based on 
modeling had to exceed two parts per billion (ppb). Id. Second, a state’s 
relative contribution to a downwind area’s total concentration of ozone above 
the NAAQS had to exceed one percent. Id. States that met both criteria were 
then further evaluated based on the magnitude, frequency, and relative 
amount of contribution to determine whether they significantly contributed to 
downwind nonattainment. Id. at 25,191–92. 
 74. See NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,362 (Oct. 27, 1998) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.F. pts. 51, 71, 75, and 96); Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. 
Reg. at 25,176. 
 75. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,230. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 25,230–31. 
 78. Id. at 25,231. 
 79. Id. at 25,176. 
 80. Id. at 25,229. 
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In the second stage, like the NOx SIP Call, CAIR left states 
the option of whether to require the highly cost-effective 
measures identified by the EPA or to submit SIPs containing 
other measures that would result in the same levels of pollution 
reduction.81 For states that chose to meet their obligations by 
regulating electricity generating units, the rule created 
optional cap-and-trade programs for NOx and SO2.82 The EPA 
intended the trading programs to be consistent with and 
expand upon existing regimes created pursuant to the NOx SIP 
Call and the Title IV acid deposition program.83 While CAIR 
was not projected to eliminate all interstate transport, the EPA 
expected implementation of the rule to result in significant 
economic, health, and other benefits at a relatively low cost.84 
CAIR was similar in some respects to the NOx SIP Call, but 
important differences ultimately proved fatal to the new rule.85 
A number of states, electrical utilities, and other groups 
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit for review of CAIR on a variety of grounds, 
consolidated in the case North Carolina v. EPA.86 The court 
ultimately found the rule sufficiently flawed that it should be 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 25,165. 
 82. Id. at 25,273–85. 
 83. Id. at 25,273. The rule required states that chose to regulate electric 
generating units, but not to participate in the CAIR trading program, to retire 
Title IV allowances in excess of their CAIR budgets. Id. at 25,259. 
 84. Id. at 25,165–66. EPA projected CAIR would result in attainment in 
fifty-two of seventy-nine counties otherwise projected to be in nonattainment 
for PM2.5 in 2010, and fifty-seven of seventy-four counties otherwise projected 
to be in nonattainment for PM2.5 in 2015. Id. at 25,165. The Agency expected 
attainment by three of forty counties otherwise projected to be in 
nonattainment for eight-hour ozone in 2010, and six of twenty-two counties for 
2015. Id. at 25,165–66. Expected health benefits related to reductions in PM2.5 
included approximately 17,000 fewer premature fatalities, 8700 fewer cases of 
chronic bronchitis, 22,000 fewer non-fatal heart attacks, 10,500 fewer hospital 
admissions, and 1.7 million fewer work-loss days. Id. at 25,166. Projected 
ozone-related benefits included 2800 fewer hospital admissions for respiratory 
illnesses, 280 fewer emergency room admissions for asthma, 690,000 fewer 
days with restricted activity levels, and 510,000 fewer days of missed school 
due to child illness. Id. At full implementation in 2015, EPA projected the rule 
would have quantifiable economic benefits ranging from $86.3 billion to $101 
billion annually, at an estimated annual cost of between $2.6 billion and $3 
billion. Id. 
 85. See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 930 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g 
granted in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 86. See generally id.; Elizabeth Kruse, Comment, North Carolina v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 283, 287 (2009). 
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vacated in its entirety.87 Most important to the analysis in this 
case are two elements of the decision: the court’s rejection of 
CAIR’s cap-and-trade program88 and its methodology for 
setting NOx and SO2 budgets.89 
The court found that the cap-and-trade program, designed 
to address upwind contribution to downwind air pollution on a 
region-wide basis, failed to effectuate the mandate established 
by the good neighbor provision.90 The court interpreted the 
statutory language to create a duty to ensure that each state 
addresses its own “significant contribution” to downwind 
nonattainment.91 By allowing sources to purchase allowances 
throughout the region, the EPA left open the possibility that a 
state could achieve its CAIR budget without reducing its 
transport to downwind states at all.92 The court held that 
because the trading program failed to require reductions based 
on each state’s quantified “significant contribution,” it exceeded 
the scope of the EPA’s statutory authority.93 
The court also held the EPA’s systems for establishing 
state budgets for both NOx and SO2 to be arbitrary and 
capricious.94 The court found that the EPA failed to adequately 
establish a connection between CAIR’s percentage-based 
reduction in the number of Title IV allowances each state 
would receive and individual states’ “significant contribution” 
under the good neighbor provision.95 Further, the court found 
                                                          
 87. North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 930. 
 88. Id. at 903. 
 89. Id. at 916–21. 
 90. Id. at 907–08 (noting that the lawfulness of the cap-and-trade 
program that survived Michigan v. U.S. EPA was never reviewed because it 
was not challenged in that case). 
 91. Id. at 907–08 (“Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) prohibits sources ‘within the 
State’ from ‘contribut[ing] significantly to nonattainment in . . . any other 
State . . . .’ Yet under CAIR, sources in Alabama, which contribute to 
nonattainment of PM2.5 NAAQS in Davidson County, North Carolina, would 
not need to reduce their emissions at all. Theoretically, sources in Alabama 
could purchase enough NOx and SO2 allowances to cover all their current 
emissions, resulting in no change in Alabama’s contribution to Davidson 
County, North Carolina’s nonattainment.” (emphasis in original) (citations 
omitted)). 
 92. Id. at 907. 
 93. Id. at 908. 
 94. Id. at 918, 921. 
 95. Id. at 917–18 (“EPA . . . explains that it chose Title IV as a starting 
point ‘to preserve the viability and emissions reductions of the highly 
successful title IV program.’ This goal may be valid, but it is not among the 
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the EPA’s identification of these reductions as achievable by 
“highly cost-effective controls” inconsistent with the 
consideration of cost approved in Michigan v. EPA.96 Michigan 
approved the EPA’s use of cost to reduce a state’s obligation by 
requiring elimination of only the portion of the state’s 
emissions that could be achieved by implementing “highly cost-
effective controls.”97 The CAIR SO2 budgets, however, began by 
establishing across-the-board, percentage-based reductions 
targets based on historic Title IV allowances, which the EPA 
then verified could be met by implementing controls identified 
as “highly cost-effective.”98 The court found that an approach in 
which the EPA simply “pick[s] a cost for a region, and deem[s] 
‘significant’ any emissions that sources can eliminate more 
cheaply . . . would not necessarily achieve something 
measurable toward the goal of prohibiting sources ‘within the 
State’ from contributing significantly to downwind 
nonattainment.”99 
The EPA’s allocation of NOx budgets was challenged for its 
reliance on fuel-adjustment factors to allocate emission 
allowances between states.100 The EPA likely intended the fuel-
adjustment factors to create a more coherent application of its 
“highly cost-effective controls” standard to different types of 
power producers, by virtue of their taking into account the 
variations in baseline emission rates and the cost, availability, 
and potential reductions of measures associated with different 
fuel types.101 The court found this approach an impermissible 
                                                          
objectives in section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). And if it is somehow compatible with 
states’ obligations to include ‘adequate provisions’ in their SIPs, prohibiting 
emissions ‘within the State from . . .  contribut[ing] significantly’ to downwind 
nonattainment, then EPA should explain how. It has failed to do so.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 96. Id. at 917. 
 97. Id. at 918 (citing Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 675 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 916. Although petitioners did not directly challenge the regional 
NOx budget, the court wrote that, as with the SO2 budgets, the EPA’s 
approach did not tailor each state’s significant contribution to cost 
considerations, but instead established a regionwide reduction target and then 
determined the reductions to be achievable through highly cost-effective 
control measures. Id. at 919. 
 101. See McCubbin, supra note 63, at 14–15 (“If EPA required all power 
plants to emit no more than, say, 0.15 pounds of NOX per million Btus 
(lbs/mmBtu), coal-fired power plants might have to spend as much as $2,000 
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attempt to equitably distribute the burden of reducing NOx 
emissions among upwind states.102 The court indicated 
willingness to defer to reasonable EPA interpretations of what 
constitutes a “significant contribution” under the good neighbor 
provision, and reiterated the Michigan court’s holding that cost 
can be considered as a factor of significance.103 The North 
Carolina court made clear, however, that an interpretation 
consistent with the statute “cannot extend so far as to make 
one state’s significant contribution depend on another state’s 
cost of eliminating emissions.”104 Each state must be 
responsible for eliminating or reducing its own “significant 
contribution” to downwind nonattainment or pollution;105 to 
survive judicial scrutiny, any rule promulgated under the good 
neighbor provision must not “require some states to exceed the 
mark.”106 
The court’s decision to vacate CAIR in its entirety shocked 
all parties, even those opposed to portions of the rule, and 
caused widespread concerns about the potential disruption and 
regulatory uncertainty that would result.107 The EPA 
petitioned the court for rehearing of the case, or, in the 
alternative, remand without vacatur.108 The same three-judge 
panel that had decided the original case agreed to the latter 
request, determining that leaving the rule in place until the 
EPA could promulgate a replacement “would at least  
 
 
                                                          
per ton of reduced emissions, whereas natural gas-fired plants would spend 
less than half that. Or, putting it another way, if a natural gas-fired power 
plant were required to spend $2,000 per ton of avoided NOX, its emissions rate 
would be roughly 0.06 lbs/mmBtu, far lower than the rate of 0.15 lbs/mmBtu 
achieved at a coal-fired facility for the same cost.” (citation omitted)). 
 102. North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 919–21. 
 103. Id. at 919. 
 104. Id. at 919–20. 
 105. Id. at 921. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Some of the parties that initially challenged CAIR pushed for its 
reinstatement after this decision, and worried that the court had “thrown out 
the baby with the bathwater.” Matthew D. Tait, Note, A Remedy Even the 
Plaintiffs Don’t Like: The D.C. Circuit’s Vacatur of the Clean Air Interstate 
Rule, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 552, 568 (2009) (discussing immediate 
reactions from petitioners, industry representatives, and others to the 
decision). 
 108. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacating 
in part 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir.). 
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temporarily preserve the environmental values covered by 
CAIR.”109 
II. EME HOMER CITY GENERATION, L.P. V. EPA 
A. THE CROSS-STATE AIR POLLUTION RULE 
In August 2011 the EPA published the Cross-State Air 
Pollution Rule (CSAPR).110 The Agency promulgated the new 
rule in response to the decision in North Carolina, and 
intended it to be consistent with the holding in that case.111 
Like CAIR, CSAPR focuses primarily on large electric 
generating units.112 Like both CAIR and the NOx SIP Call, the 
rule uses a two-stage approach to identify covered states and to 
determine their reduction obligations.113 First, the EPA 
identified states whose measured emissions at any downwind 
receptor exceeded a threshold amount, set at one percent of the 
relevant NAAQS.114 A total of twenty-seven states met or 
exceeded these threshold levels for one or more NAAQS.115 The 
EPA then, using a multi-factor analysis taking into account 
both air quality impact and cost, determined each state’s 
emissions that were a significant contribution to 
nonattainment or interference with maintenance.116 CSAPR 
retained a limited role for emissions trading, but “the Rule also 
maintain[ed] State-specific limits by means of assurance 
provisions that ‘ensure that the necessary emission reductions 
occur within each covered state.’”117 In a substantial departure 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 1178. 
 110. CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97). 
 111. Id. at 48,211 (“EPA’s approach in the Transport Rule . . . is guided by 
and consistent with the Court’s opinion in North Carolina . . . .”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 48,236. The EPA used threshold levels of 0.15 g/m3 for annual 
PM2.5, 0.35 g/m3 for twenty-four-hour PM2.5, and 0.8 ppb for eight-hour ozone. 
Id. 
 115. Id. at 48,209. Eighteen states met or exceeded the threshold level for 
annual PM2.5. Id. at 48,240. Twenty-two states were included for 24-hour 
PM2.5. Id. at 24,242. Twenty-six states exceeded threshold contributions for 
ozone. Id. at 24,245. 
 116. Id. at 48,211. 
 117. Brief for Respondents at 10, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. 
EPA, 696 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1302) (quoting CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg.  
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from its approach in the NOx SIP Call and CAIR, the EPA 
issued FIPs concurrently with CSAPR.118 A number of states, 
local governments, industry groups, and labor organizations 
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit for review of CSAPR, arguing that the EPA 
had exceeded the scope of its statutory authority.119 
B. THE DECISION 
On December 30, 2011, the court granted an order 
temporarily staying CSAPR.120 The order instructed the EPA to 
continue to administer CAIR pending a resolution of the 
challenges to the new rule.121 On August 21, 2012, two 
members of the three-judge panel held that the EPA had again 
exceeded its statutory authority and the rule should thus be 
vacated in its entirety.122 Judge Rogers issued a lengthy and 
vigorous dissent, arguing that the court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the case and that, even if the case were 
appropriately before the court, the majority decided it 
incorrectly.123 
The majority, pointing primarily to the decision in North 
Carolina and the text of the Clean Air Act, laid out three 
requirements for any implementation of the good neighbor 
provision to survive review.124 First, the EPA may not require a 
                                                          
48,208, 48,271 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 
97)). 
 118. CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208. CAIR gave states eighteen months to 
submit SIPs complying with its requirements. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 
Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,263 (May 12, 2005). The EPA promulgated FIPs pursuant 
to the rule about a year later, but made clear the FIPs were intended as a 
“backstop” and that the agency did not intend to interfere with timely and 
adequate SIPs. Federal Implementation Plans To Reduce Interstate Transport 
of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone, 71 Fed. Reg. 25,328, 25,341 (Apr. 28, 
2006). 
 119. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 11 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
 120. Id. at 19. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 37. 
 123. Id. at 38 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Notably, Judge Rogers sat on the 
panels that decided both Michigan and North Carolina, while neither of the 
two judges in the majority, Judge Kavanaugh and Judge Griffith, participated 
in deciding either of the two previous cases interpreting the good neighbor 
provision. See Michigan v. U.S. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2000); North 
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 124. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 20–22. 
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state to reduce more than its own “significant contribution.”125 
If the EPA defines some level of contribution as insignificant, 
the statute does not authorize the EPA to require emission 
reductions that would reduce transport below that threshold.126 
To require further reductions, the majority found, would be an 
attempt to use the statute as “a blank check for EPA to address 
interstate pollution on a regional basis without regard to an 
individual upwind State’s actual contribution to downwind air 
quality.”127 Second, each state’s required reduction must be 
proportional, taking into account the magnitude of the 
contribution relative to those of other upwind states and of the 
affected downwind state.128 Specifically, the majority stated, 
“the collective burden must be allocated among the upwind 
States in proportion to the size of their contributions to the 
downwind State’s nonattainment.”129 Third, the “end goal” of 
the statute is attainment in downwind states, and the EPA 
may not require more reductions than are necessary to meet 
that goal.130 Any rule promulgated under the good neighbor 
provision must not “produce more than necessary ‘over-control’ 
in the downwind States—that is, [the EPA must ensure] that 
the obligations do not go beyond what is necessary for the 
downwind States to achieve the NAAQS.”131 
The majority held that by using a numerical threshold for 
inclusion in the rule, the EPA established a “floor”—and any 
level of transport below that threshold is presumptively not 
“significant” for purposes of the good neighbor provision.132 By 
then ignoring this “floor” when it considered cost to calculate 
each state’s “significant contribution,” the EPA created the 
possibility that a state “may be required to reduce its emissions 
by an amount greater than the ‘significant contribution’ that 
brought it into the program in the first place.”133 The majority 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 20–22, 25. 
 126. Id. 20–22. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 21. 
 130. Id. at 20. 
 131. Id. at 22. 
 132. Id. at 23. 
 133. Id. at 25. The court relied on North Carolina’s requirement that the 
EPA cannot require some states to “exceed the mark.” Id. (citing North 
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). The court determined by  
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also found CSAPR inconsistent with the requirement of 
proportionality “because it made no attempt to calculate 
upwind States’ required reductions on a proportional basis that 
took into account contributions of other upwind States to the 
downwind States’ nonattainment problems.”134 Finally, the 
majority held the EPA’s approach “failed to ensure” that the 
aggregate reductions required of upwind states would not lead 
to “over-control” in downwind states.135 The EPA “may not 
require upwind States to do more than necessary for the 
downwind States to achieve the NAAQS.”136 
The majority also found fault with CSAPR’s issuance of 
FIPs concurrently with the reduction requirements set forward 
in the rule, rather than giving states an opportunity to satisfy 
the requirements with SIPs and avoid direct federal 
regulation.137 It based its conclusion that CSAPR exceeded the 
EPA’s statutory mandate in this respect on the longstanding 
notion that regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act is 
firmly divided between the federal government and the 
states.138 The EPA is responsible for promulgation of air quality 
standards, but each state has “primary responsibility for 
attaining those standards within its own borders.”139 The court 
has interpreted this rule to create a strict “federalism bar” that 
precludes the EPA from using the SIP process to require a state 
to implement specific mitigation measures.140 
The EPA argued CSPAR was justified by previous findings 
                                                          
setting a numerical threshold for conclusion, the EPA had defined the “mark.” 
Id. 
 134. Id. at 26–27 (“To be sure, under Michigan, EPA may rely on cost-
effectiveness factors in order to allow some upwind States to do less than their 
full fair share. But when EPA asks one upwind State to eliminate more than 
its statutory fair share, that State is necessarily being forced to clean up 
another upwind State’s share of the mess in the downwind State. Under the 
statute and North Carolina, that is impermissible.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 135. Id. at 27. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 37. 
 138. Id. at 29. 
 139. Id. (citing Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63–67 
(1975); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 600 F.3d 624, 625 (D.C. Cir. 2010); and 
Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1406–10 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
 140. Id. (citing Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1046 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (citing Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 95 
(1975); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997); and Michigan v. U.S. 
EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2000))). 
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issued to the affected states for failures to either submit SIPs 
or obtain EPA approval of SIP submissions.141 The majority 
found, however, that states have no obligation under the good 
neighbor provision until the EPA defines each state’s 
“significant contribution”—the amount of pollution a state must 
address in its SIP provision for the SIP to be acceptable.142 It 
rejected arguments by the EPA that the good neighbor 
provision contained in section 110 of the Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970, which lays out minimum requirements 
for SIPs, creates an obligation for states to independently 
include adequate provisions in SIPs to prohibit “pollution in 
amounts which will ‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’ 
or ‘interfere with maintenance’ of the new NAAQS in a 
downwind State.”143 The opinion points to prior EPA 
statements suggesting that coherent implementation of the 
good neighbor provision requires the EPA to first define state 
obligations, and finds EPA rulemaking approaches consistent 
with these statements in CAIR and the NOx SIP Call.144 
                                                          
 141. Id. at 31. 
 142. Id. at 32 (“[T]he good neighbor obligation is not a clear numerical 
target—far from it—until EPA defines the target. Even after EPA sets a 
NAAQS, an upwind State’s good neighbor obligation for that pollutant is 
nebulous and unknown. The statutory standard is ‘amounts’ of pollution which 
will ‘contribute significantly to nonattainment’ or ‘interfere with maintenance’ 
of the new NAAQS in a downwind State. There is no way for an upwind State 
to know its obligation without knowing levels of air pollution in downwind 
States and then apportioning its responsibility for each downwind State’s 
nonattainment. Therefore, the upwind State’s obligation remains impossible 
for the upwind State to determine until EPA defines it. Without further 
definition by EPA, a prohibition on ‘amounts which will . . . contribute 
significantly’ is like a road sign that tells drivers to drive “carefully.” The 
regulated entities—here, the upwind States—need more precise guidance to 
know how to conform their conduct to the law. A SIP logically cannot be 
deemed to lack a ‘required submission’ or deemed to be deficient for failure to 
meet the good neighbor obligation before EPA quantifies the good neighbor 
obligation.” (emphasis in original) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 143. Id. The EPA argued that under Clean Air Act section 110(c)(1), it was 
required here to promulgate a FIP within two years of finding a SIP deficient 
in implementing the state’s good neighbor obligation. Id. at 30–31. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1) (2006). 
 144. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 34–36 (“The task of 
determining the reductions necessary to meet section 110(a)(2)(D) involves 
allocating the use of the downwind States’ air basin. This area is a commons in 
the sense that the contributing State or States have a greater interest in 
protecting their local interests than in protecting an area in a downwind State 
over which they do not have jurisdiction and for which they are not politically 
accountable. Thus, in general, it is reasonable to assume that EPA may be in a 
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The majority ultimately found that, due to these flaws it 
perceived in CSAPR, the appropriate remedy was vacatur and 
remand to the EPA.145 
C. THE MAJORITY DECISION IN EME HOMER CITY GENERATION 
SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
1. Petitioners’ Objections to the EPA’s Interpretation of the 
Good Neighbor Provision Were Not Properly Before the Panel 
If the EPA chooses to appeal and the Supreme Court 
agrees to hear the case, the Court will face difficult questions—
first and foremost is whether the panel should have heard key 
arguments in the case at all. 
In her dissent, Judge Rogers argues that neither the 
statutory objections to the EPA’s definition of each state’s 
obligations under CSAPR nor the issue of the EPA’s decision to 
utilize FIPs were properly preserved for review.146 Judge 
Rogers argues that the limitations on judicial review imposed 
by Clean Air Act sections 307(b)(1) and 307(d)(7)(B) exist for 
two important reasons: “[T]o enforce repose so that the 
rulemaking process is not crippled by surprise challenges to 
matters that were rightfully presumed settled, and to 
guarantee an agency’s expert consideration and possible 
correction of any flaws in its rules before the matter reaches a 
court.”147 The statutory filing period created by section 
307(b)(1), she argues, has been strictly construed as 
“jurisdictional in nature”—if petitioners fail to comply with it, 
the court cannot address their claims.148 Judge Rogers cites a 
                                                          
better position to determine the appropriate goal, or budget, for the 
contributing States, while leaving [it] to the contributing States’ discretion to 
determine the mix of controls to make the necessary reductions.” (emphasis 
added by the court) (quoting NOx SIP Call, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,370 (Oct. 
27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96))). 
 145. Id. at 37–38. 
 146. Id. at 38–40 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 147. Id. at 38 (emphasis in original). 
 148. Id. at 40 (quoting Med. Waste Inst. & Energy Recovery Council v. 
EPA, 645 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see also Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. 
EPA, 237 F.3d 681, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has explained 
that ‘judicial review provisions are jurisdictional in nature and must be 
construed with strict fidelity to their terms. This is all the more true of 
statutory provisions specifying the timing of review, for those time limits are, 
as we have often stated, mandatory and jurisdictional, and are not subject to 
equitable tolling.’” (alterations omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Stone v. 
DOOLEY_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2013  12:03 PM 
914 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
long line of cases for the proposition that section 307(d)(7)(B)’s 
requirement that any objection be raised “with reasonable 
specificity during the public comment period” is equally 
important, and has thus been interpreted very strictly, 
especially when the challenge at issue is to an agency’s 
interpretation of its governing statute.149 
The majority relies on two comments, the decision in North 
Carolina v. EPA and the administrative record in that earlier 
case, to support its conclusion that the statutory challenges to 
CSAPR’s reduction obligations were adequately preserved for 
review.150 The comments cited by the majority, which were 
submitted by Tennessee and Wisconsin during the notice and 
comment rulemaking process, do not raise the statutory 
objection addressed by the court.151 The majority finds, 
however, that the comments were reasonably specific under the 
particular circumstances of CSAPR’s promulgation to give the 
EPA notice that they might provide the basis for a challenge in 
court.152 
The majority argues that, because the EPA promulgated 
CSAPR directly in response to the District of Columbia 
Circuit’s remand in North Carolina and its instruction to craft 
a new rule “consistent with our opinion,” the EPA was aware of 
that decision—specifically, the requirement that once the EPA 
defines each upwind state’s “significant contribution,” it may 
not “require some states to exceed the mark.”153 As Judge 
                                                          
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 149. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 52 (Rogers, J., dissenting) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2011)); see also Cement Kiln Recycling 
Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“While there are surely 
limits on the level of congruity required between a party’s arguments before 
an administrative agency and the court, respect for agencies’ proper role in the 
Chevron framework requires that the court be particularly careful to ensure 
that challenges to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute are first 
raised in the administrative forum.” (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. 
U.S. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1994))). 
 150. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 24 n.18. 
 151. See id. at 53 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“[Tennessee’s] comment does not 
suggest that EPA is statutorily barred from following its 
approach . . . Wisconsin’s comment also does not demonstrate the statutory 
authority challenge now advanced by petitioners in this court was 
preserved.”). 
 152. Id. at 24–25 n.18 (majority opinion). 
 153. Id. (quoting North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 921 (D.C. Cir. 
2008)). 
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Rogers points out, however, the North Carolina court expressly 
left the specific approach challenged here—the EPA’s two-
pronged analysis to determine initial inclusion in its rule and 
each state’s obligations—undisturbed.154 The majority also 
points to the EPA’s dismissal of a similar comment during the 
development of the Clean Air Interstate Rule.155 The majority 
argues the rejection of a similar argument in a prior 
rulemaking was “highly relevant.”156 Judge Rogers argues 
inclusion of this comment in the record is suspect for a number 
of reasons. First, the comment was not introduced to the 
present case until rebuttal oral argument.157 Furthermore, in 
American Petroleum Institute v. U.S. EPA, the EPA had 
incorporated the prior rulemaking docket into the record of the 
regulation at issue, which was something that was not done in 
this case.158 Finally, like the comments submitted during the 
CSAPR rulemaking, the previous comment expressed a policy 
preference, not a direct challenge to the EPA’s statutory 
authority.159  Because the EPA was never given an opportunity 
during the comment period to directly address the statutory 
challenge at issue in this case, Judge Rogers argues, the 
question was not properly preserved for review.160 
Judge Rogers’ arguments are persuasive. The problems 
with the majority’s reach for jurisdiction are evident in the 
conditional language used in its decision: “[U]nder the Rule, a 
State then may be required to reduce its emissions by an 
amount greater than the ‘significant contribution’ that brought 
it into the program in the first place.”161 This language reflects 
the failure of petitioners to submit any modeling projections or 
other data to support the conclusion that such a result would 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 54–55 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing North Carolina v. EPA, 531 
F.3d 896, 916–17 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 155. Id. at 24–25 n.18. 
 156. Id. (citing Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1120 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 157. Id. at 55 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“This comment . . . cannot carry the 
weight the court assigns to it . . . .”). 
 158. Id. at 56 (“The CAIR comment that EPA rejected in the other 
rulemaking is therefore not ‘the same argument’ that petitioners belatedly 
attempt to raise now.”); see also Am. Petroleum Inst. v. U.S. EPA, 52 F.3d 
1113, 1120 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 159. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 56 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 160. Id. at 57. 
 161. Id. at 25 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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actually occur.162 Petitioners instead relied on simplistic 
hypotheticals that fail to adequately communicate the 
complexity and fundamentally regional nature of the 
problem.163 If the issue had been properly raised during the 
comment period, the EPA could have directly analyzed it.164 
Even without direct study, the EPA determined that record 
evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the feared result 
would be “extremely unlikely” under the rule.165 Despite any 
concrete evidence to the contrary, the majority accepts the 
hypothetical risk of over-regulation presented by petitioners as 
sufficient justification to send the EPA back to the drawing 
board. 
2. The Panel’s Decision Imposes an Overly Restrictive 
Interpretation of the Good Neighbor Provision That Is Not 
Required by the Statute 
Even if the court finds the challenges to CSAPR were 
within the court’s jurisdiction, the challenges should be 
rejected. In addition to the requirement that the EPA consider 
any quantified threshold contribution for inclusion in a rule a 
floor for significance, the panel decision creates two new 
restrictions on the EPA’s authority. 
First, the majority bases its establishment of both its 
threshold-as-floor and proportionality requirements in 
language included in the North Carolina court’s discussion of 
state NOx budgets under CAIR.166 At issue there was the EPA’s 
decision, after setting a regional NOx budget based on the 
product of the total regional heat input of all power plants and 
a control emissions rate the EPA determined was achievable by 
all power plants via implementation of “highly cost-effective” 
controls, to determine state-by-state allocations of trading 
allowances based on a fuel-adjustment factor.167  The court 
                                                          
 162. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 33. 
 163. For an example of such a hypothetical, see Final Brief of Industry and 
Labor Petitioners at 22–23, EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 
F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1302). 
 164. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 33–34 n.20 (“Due to the 
lack of comments, this was not an issue that EPA analyzed in a direct fashion 
for the Rule.”). 
 165. Id. at 33. 
 166. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 20–22. 
 167. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 918–19 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g granted 
in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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determined this system, which granted more allowances to 
states with a higher proportion of coal-fired power plants, was 
an impermissible attempt to equitably distribute the burden of 
reducing pollution among upwind states.168 There was a very 
real danger that some states would “share the burden of 
reducing other upwind states’ emissions.”169 Because CAIR 
relied exclusively on a regional trading system, the court found 
that “[t]he net result will be that states with mainly oil- and 
gas-fired [electric generating units (EGUs)] will subsidize 
reductions in states with mainly coal-fired EGUs.”170 This 
approach was held contrary to the statute, which “requires 
each state to prohibit emissions ‘within the State’ that 
contribute significantly to downwind pollution, not to pay for 
other states to prohibit their own contributions.”171 CSAPR 
presents no such difficulties. Each state is required to reduce 
emissions “within the state” in accordance with its own 
“significant contribution,” as defined by the EPA in the rule.172 
While CSAPR retains a limited role for emissions trading, “the 
Rule also maintains State-specific limits by means of assurance 
provisions that ‘ensure that the necessary emission reductions 
occur within each covered state,’”173 and the trading provisions 
were not challenged.174 The majority here, however, would 
stretch the language applied by the North Carolina court to 
effectively create a restrictive definition of “significant 
contribution.”175 This may be a logical extension of the holding 
in North Carolina. It is certainly one reasonable interpretation  
 
                                                          
 168. Id. at 921 (“Because the fuel-adjustment factors shifted the burden of 
emission reductions solely in pursuit of equity among upwind states—an 
improper reason—the resulting state budgets were arbitrary and capricious.”). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (2006)). 
 172. See CSAPR, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,211 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97) (“EPA believes this methodology [in 
CSAPR] addresses the [North Carolina] court’s concern that the approach 
used in CAIR was insufficiently state-specific.”). 
 173. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 10 (quoting CSAPR, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 48,208, 48,271 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 52, 72, 78, 
and 97)). 
 174. The court in EME Homer City Generation opines that “interstate 
trading is generally permitted.” EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 
696 F.3d 7, 18 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 175. See id. at 25 n.19. 
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of the statutory text, but it is not, as the majority suggests, one 
that is demanded by the statute. 
The majority cites no authority for its position that “the 
end goal of [section 110 of the Clean Air Act] is attainment in 
the downwind State.”176 It also, somewhat ironically, 
completely neglects in its discussion of potential over-
regulation the “interference with maintenance” prong of the 
good neighbor provision, which the court in North Carolina 
expressly instructed the EPA to give independent effect in any 
replacement rule.177 The EPA designed its rule and defined 
each state’s significant contribution based on the complicated 
relationships between states.178 Most upwind states contribute 
to pollution in multiple downwind states, and most downwind 
states are affected by multiple upwind states.179 Many states 
are both “upwind” and “downwind” for purposes of the good 
neighbor provision; they both contribute to other states’ 
pollution problems and suffer from problems caused by out-of-
state pollution.180 
The EME Homer City Generation majority acknowledges 
that “there may be some truly unavoidable over-control in some 
downwind States that occurs as a byproduct of the necessity of 
reducing upwind States’ emissions enough to meet the NAAQS 
in other downwind States.”181 The majority opinion fails, 
however, to offer any insight as to how the EPA might craft an 
effective and practicable rule in line with the new restrictions 
the decision places on the Agency. The EPA’s approach is a 
reasonable attempt to effectuate the Clean Air Act’s good 
neighbor provision, and to address the complex web of linkages 
between upwind and downwind states. The statutory language 
is sufficiently ambiguous that a reasonable interpretation by 
the EPA should be afforded deference.182 
                                                          
 176. Id. at 20. 
 177. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 910–11 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g granted 
in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 178. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 37–38. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 22 . 
 182. Cf. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984) (holding that where an agency’s governing statute is silent or 
ambiguous as to a given issue, an agency interpretation is entitled to 
deference as long as the interpretation is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute). 
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3. The Challenge to EPA’s Issuance of FIPs was Both 
Improperly Reached and Incorrectly Decided as a Matter  
of Statutory Interpretation 
Judge Rogers argues that the court’s decision to address 
objection to CSAPR’s utilization of FIPs was similarly 
inappropriate.183 Affected states were put on notice of the 
EPA’s express intent to issue a FIP within two years of when 
the agency published findings of their failure to submit 
adequate SIPs.184 The proper time to object to promulgation of 
a FIP, Judge Rogers asserts, was within sixty days of that 
publication.185 
Again, even if the court finds the decision to hear the case 
was appropriate, the majority advances as mandatory an 
interpretation of the relevant statutory language that has no 
textual basis. The majority’s interpretation would create a 
distinct process, initiated by EPA rulemaking to define each 
state’s “significant contribution,” that requires states to first 
submit a SIP containing provisions to address transport.186 
This is not how the statute is written. Every state, in every 
SIP, is required to provide “adequate . . . provisions” to satisfy 
the requirements of the good neighbor statute.187 Upon a 
finding of failure to submit an adequate SIP, the EPA is 
required, within two years, to promulgate a FIP unless the 
state addresses the deficiencies.188 
While it may be preferable from a cooperative federalism 
standpoint to allow states a first attempt at any targeted 
reductions, this is not required by the statute. The majority 
would replace the language and structure of the statute with 
its own policy-based rule.189 The FIP provisions are intended to 
address state failure to act. In issuing its findings of failure to 
submit adequate SIPS and in promulgating CSAPR, the EPA 
                                                          
 183. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 43 (Rogers, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he court reaches the merits of this issue despite its lack of jurisdiction.”). 
 184. Id. at 41 (citing Failure to Submit Good Neighbor SIP Finding, 75 Fed 
Reg. 32,673, 32,674 (June 9, 2010)). 
 185. Id. at 41–42. 
 186. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 187. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d at 47 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 46. 
 189. Id. at 48 (“The court’s ‘role is not to correct the text so that it better 
serves the statute’s purposes . . . .’” (quoting Va. Dep’t of Med. Assistance 
Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 678 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 
2012)). 
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made a determination, within its statutory authority, that the 
failure of states to adequately address transport issues 
warranted direct federal intervention. 
Allowing the majority decision in EME Homer City 
Generation to stand would significantly limit the EPA’s ability 
to address the fundamentally regional problem of interstate air 
pollution. The rules outlined by the court severely curtail the 
EPA’s discretion to define what constitutes each state’s 
significant contribution to downwind pollution by requiring the 
EPA to tailor each state’s obligation to its precise, proportional 
share of the quantity of pollution above a downwind attainment 
threshold.190 The decision allows for costs to be considered, but 
only after defining a state’s baseline obligation determined by 
the aforementioned criteria. This would effectively leave the 
EPA three options: 1) impose incredibly burdensome, if not 
unachievable, obligations on certain states;191 2) require only 
minimal reductions and leave a large portion of the problem 
unaddressed; or 3) rely on alternative Clean Air Act provisions 
that address the problem in a piecemeal fashion and have 
otherwise proved ineffective.192 If the decision and its 
restrictive reading of the good neighbor provision are allowed to 
stand, the Clean Air Act must then be amended to allow for 
meaningful regulation of interstate air pollution. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority decision in EME Homer City Generation 
imposes an unnecessarily burdensome reading of the Clean Air 
Act’s good neighbor provision that drastically curtails the 
ability of the EPA to address interstate air pollution. The 
decision should be overturned and CSAPR implemented for two 
reasons. First, the majority reached key issues despite a failure 
by petitioners to adequately raise and preserve the issues 
during the relevant notice and comment rulemaking period. 
Second, the majority based its decision on questionable 
                                                          
 190. Brief for Respondents, supra note 117, at 13 (“From a technical 
perspective, EPA explained why an air quality-only approach . . . would not be 
an effective or efficient overall response to the complex collective-contribution 
problem presented here, and this analysis stands essentially undisputed.”). 
 191. Id. at 29 (“[T]he resulting limitations in certain States would be so 
onerous as to make the control regime practically unworkable.”). 
 192. For a discussion of the Clean Air Act’s statutory structure and its 
effectiveness, see supra notes 16–52 and accompanying text. 
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readings of the relevant statutory language and failed to grant 
the EPA the deference it is due under well-established 
principles of statutory interpretation. If the decision is allowed 
to stand, the Clean Air Act must be amended to give the EPA 
adequate discretion to achieve the statute’s goal. 
 
